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Abstr act

n among
1'his is a model of searc h for job openi ngs with comp etitio
worke rs.

ibrium
A parti al equil ibrium is d,scr ib,d in t3rms of an equil

g no job.
searc h inten sity and equil ibrium proba bility of findin

The

of worke rs is
equil ibrium is Paret o ineff icien t when only the welfa re
m can be
consi dered . An unsub sidize d unemp loyme nt insura nce progra
used to incre ase each work er's welfa re.

S,arch, Applications and Vacanci,s

Yat, Univ,rsity and Univ,rsity of Virginia

Abstract
This is a mod,l of s,arch for job op,nings with comp,tition among
work,rs. A partial ,quilibrium. is d,scrib,d in terms of an ,qnilibrium
search int,nsity and ,quilibrium probability of finding no job. Th,
,quilibrium is Par,to in,ffici,nt whan only th, w,lfar, of work,rs is
consid,r,d. An unsubsidiz,d un,mploym,nt insuranc, program can b,
us,d to incr,as, each worker's w,lfar,.

Section 1:

Introduction

Ov,r th, last f,w years th, efficiency of s,arch ,qnilibria has b,en
,xamin,d by a numb,r of authors.

In a s,ri,s of pap,rs, Diamond [(1981).

(1982a), (1982b). (1984)] has looked at this issu, in d,pth.

Diamond (1981)

shows that in a market with a distribution of match sp,cific mobility costs, an
unemploym,nt insurance program can improv, th, ,x ant, w,lfar, of all work,rs
by inducing ,ach of th,m to for,go opportuniti,s with high mobility costs.
Diamond (1982b) shows that in a market with no competition among ag,nts, th,r,
ar, multipl, ,quilibria, all of which ar, Par,to in,ffici,nt.

Th, in,ffici,ncy

I hav, gained much insight from discussions with Paul Schultz, K,nn,th
Wolpin, T. N. Srinivasan, Russ,11 Cooper and Jonathan Eaton.

Participants of

workshops at Yal,. Corn,tl, Chicago, Pann. Virginia, Cal T,ch and Tohns-Hopkins
hav, provid,d us,ful comm,nts.
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occurs because no agent internalizes the value of his increased search activity
to other searchers.

Diamond and Maskin (1979). (1981). and Mortensen (1981),

(1982a) (1982b) show in matching models that the charactetistics of the
inefficiencies in equilibrium depend upon the search technology.

With the

exception of Mortensen ( 1981). ( 1982a) none of these models al lows for
contemporaneous competition among searchers.

1

Wilde (1977) has developed a model where the equilibrium price
distribution is determined by the level of search intensity of consumers.
each consumer increases his intensity, all sellers lower their prices.

When

This

implies that the equilibrium search intensity is Pareto inefficient if only the
welfare of consumers is considered; each consumer's welfare would increase if
all consumers searched a little harder.

Wilde's results depend crucially upon

a lack of competition among consumers for the goods being sold.

[See Stern

(1985). Chapter IV for a further discussion].
Most labor markets are characterized by some de·gree of competition for
a small number of job openings.

This is especially true when the unemployment

rate is high or there is a particularly attractive job opening.

Firms may

limit the number of job openings because of diminishing returns to scale in
production and lags in the hiring process.
further discussion].

[See Stern (1985). Chapter IV for a

If the number of job openings is small relative· to the

number of workers searching for those openings, then the competition among the

1 Matching problems wit.bout externalities have been examined as welL
Jovanovic (1979) has examined markets where the productivity of a particular
match is unknown ex ante.

Crawford and Knoer {1981) have examined markets

where the productivity of all possible matches is known ex ante.

3

workers will be a crucial aspect of the economic environment of the workers. 2
The rivalry literature [see for example Kamien and Schwarz (1972),
Loury (1979), Mortenson (1981) (1982a), (1982b), and Wright (1983)] has shown
that when there is a common goal that a number of agents are striving to
achieve. and when all of the benefits of achieving that goal go only to the
first agent who is successful, then there is excessive rivalry among the
agents.

Each agent must choose an intensity with which to strive for the goal

given the intensity of other agents.

Marginal units of intensity are costly.

An externality results because each agent ignores the effect his intensity has
on the other agents' probability of achieving the goal first.
problem has been used mostly to examine the

The rivalry

market for research and

development.
This paper examines a generalized rivalry problem in the labor market.
It employs a simple labor supply model as a framework to analyze labor markets
characterized by search with competitioa among searchers.
market process for new hires is described.

First, the labor

The searching worker's

opportunities are determined by the market parameter which is the probability
that an application will not generate a job offer.

The model is closed by

determining the value of the market parameter given the search strategy that
each worker individually follows.

There exists a nontrivial equilibrium, and

it is Pareto inefficient when only the welfare of the workers is considered.
To get rid of the inefficiency, a feasible, Pareto-improving government policy

2 Lucas and Prescott (1974) present an equilibrium search model with
competition.

However, the competition only affects the equilibrium wage

because markets clear each period.

4

This is done for an

using taxes and unemployment insurance is introduced.

economy with search unemployment in both a static and a steady state dynamic
framework.

Section 2:

The Market Mechanism

There are B firms, each of which costlessly advertises n vacancies in
A period is the length of time it takes for a

the local want ads every period.

firm to list an ad, receive applications, make offers, receive replies and hire
those who accept.

No deceptive advertising is allowed.

Then are also N

identical unemployed workers every period who costhssly look through the want
The cost

ads and determine the number of firms, m, to which they should apply.
of applying tom firms is C(m).

This represents transportation costs, time

costs, and any direct costs of informing firms of one's interest in a job.
is assumed tha-t C(O)

It

= 0, C' Cm) > 0, C' '(m) 2. 0 and C(B) is very large

relative to the benefits of getting a job.
Each worker applies to firms without knowing exactly what other workers
will do. 3

However, he knows or can derive the distribution function of the

number of applicants at each firm.

Once a firm has received applications for a

period, if it receives at least n applications, it randomly offers n applicants
jobs at a wage of w.

If it receives fewer than n applications, it offers all

applicants jobs at the same wage.

Firms are not allowed to have waiting lists.

A worker will accept any offer made to him unless he receives more than one

3Formally, this assumption means that asymmetric equilibria are ruled
· out since they require coordination among workers.

A worker cannot announce

where he plans to apply or discuss his decision with other workers.
workers must play symmetric roles at equilibrium.

Therefore,

s
offer in the same period.

Then. since all offers have the same value, the

worker randomly selects one of the offers.

Once he has accepted an offer from

a firm, he works for that firm forever receiving a wage w once a period.

He

receives an unemployment insurance payment (UI payment), u. once a period until
he finds a job.

It is assumed that u is less than w.

It is assumed that the equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
(which is sometimes called a 'supply side equilibrium' since all choices in the
model are made by the suppliers of labor, i.e. the workers).

This means that

each unemployed worker treats the application strategies of other workers, and
thus the probabilities of receiving job offers, as given, and that at
equilibrium all workers adopt the same strategy.

A worker prefers to apply to

jobs with high probabilities of receiving offers over firms with low
probabilities of receiving offers and randomly chooses among firms with the
same probability of receiving an offer.

Each worker forms expectations either

through past experience in the labor market, through contact with other
workers, or by computing where the Nash equilibrium will occur. 4
The probability of being offered a job at_ a particular firm depends
upon how many vacancies the firm advertises and the distribution function of
the number of applicants it will receive.
probability is derived later in the paper.

The explicit formula for this
For now, it is only important to

recognize that in equilibrium, the probability of any worker receiving an offer
from any firm must be the same for all firms.

If, for any one worker, there

were two firms with different probabilities of making offers, then the two
firms would have different probabilities for everyone.

Everyone applying to

4computation poses some problems when there is more than one Nash
equilibrium.

6

the low probability firm would have incentive to apply to the high probability
firm instead.

But then the probability of receiving an offer at the low

probability firm would be unity; it actually would be a high probability
firm.

Therefore, the application strategies could not be a Nash equilibrium.

Thus. it must be true that in equilibrium, all firms have the same ex ante
probability of offering a worker a job, and so a worker's decision is
characterized by the number of firms to which he applies.
Section 3:

The Worker's Problem

The first step in solving the supply side equilibrium is deriving the
objective function that each unemployed worker maximizes.

As in most of the

search literature, it is assumed that a worker maximizes the expscted value of
search which equals the values of having a job and continued search, each
weighted by the probability of being in that state, minus search costs.

Let:

y = probability of not being offered a job at a firm to which a

worker applies.

If a worker applies tom firms. the probability of being offered at least one
job is (1-ym).

Let~ be each worker's discount factor.

value of applying tom firms.

3.1)

V(m)

•

= u - C(m)

Let

V(m)

equal the

Then:

+ P(l - ym)w/(1-~) +

~rmy•

where V

is the value of the optimal strategy that will be followed next

period.

Since the market is in a steady state, the optimal strategy will be

the same every period.
The behavior of each worker can be derived by looking at the first
order condition for equation (3.1):

7

av(m)/am

3.2)

= -C'(m) - ymlny[f3w/(l-f3) - f3V•] = 0.

The second order condition is:

•
-C''(m) - y m(lny) 2 [f3w/(l-f3) - f3V]

3.3)

< O.

•

Since Uw/{1-f3) - f3V ] is the difference in value between having a job and not
having a job, it must be positive; otherwise there would be no search.

the assumption that C''(m)

1

Thus,

0 implies that the second order condition holds

Therefore, the first order condition is a necessary and sufficient

globally.

condition for a global maximum.

•

Equa_tion (3.2) provides an implicit equation for m • the optimal level
of applications.
by evaluating

The necessary conditions for positive search can be derived

av/am

at m = 0:

•

3.4)

av(O)/am = -C'(O) - lny[f3w/(l-f3) - f3V (0)]

3.S)

= -C'(O) - f3(w - u)lny/(l-f3)

>0

since if m = 0 is the optimal strategy today, it will also be the optimal
strategy tomorrow. Thus, if the difference between wand u is high enough, y is
·
. 1 ow enoug h • th ere w1. 11 b e pos1· t 1ve
searc h • S
h and C' ( 0) 1s
1ow enoug,

s
search.

This assumes that unemployed workers receive u whether or not they

If u is paid to all unemployed workers, then workers only consider the

difference between wand u in their search decision.

If u is only paid to

unemployed workers who search, then the sizes of wand u enter the search
decision in a nonlinear way.

8

It can b, shown by looking at the derivative of av/am with respect to
exogenous variables what the comparative statics for the workers are:

•

am /ap >
and

am•/ay

o.

•

am /aw>

o.

•

am /au<

o. 6

•

has the opposite sign of (m lny + 1).

If w rises, then the

difference in value between working and searching increases.
worker to search more.

This causes the

If Prises, then the worker discounts the future less

heavily. causing the value of the wage stream to rise mor, than the application
costs.

Thus, the number of applications rises. Similarly, higher marginal

search costs cause the worker to apply less.

Finally, if y rises, then the

incremental probability of getting a job by searching a little harder is
-y m-1 ( mlny + 1) which can be either negative or positive.
To be more precise, m should be either an integer or a representation
of a mixed strategy, and the first order analysis should be adjusted
However, as long as m > 1, the continuous approximation to the

accordingly.

problem provides much insight with little loss of accuracy.
Section 4:

Probability of Rejection

The only open parameter left to determine is y, the probability of the
worker not receiving an offer at a firm to which he applied.

6

It is easier to

u is really the UI payment to be received the next period which

increases v•.

The UI payment received this period has no effect on m since it

is only a negative fixed cost of search.
7

This is for a case where the marginal cost of applying rises by a

constant amount for all m's.
precisely, if Ca(m)

= c(m)

For example, if C(m)

+ am,

assertion is that dm • Ida< O.

then

c0 (m) =

C(m)

= cm,

then C'(m)

and C' (m)
a

= c.

More

= C'(m) +a.The

9

comput, y by thinking of it as:
N-l

~

4.l)

[Pr(not off,rsd job I a+ l applicants apply)•

a=O
Pr(a othsr applicants apply)].

If th,rs ar, n vacanci,s adv,rtis,d:

Pr(not off,r,d job I a+ 1 applicants apply)= max(O, 1 - n/(a + 1)).

4.2)

Sine, thsrs ar, N-1 work,rs othsr than th, on, ,valuating y and ,ach of thsm
applies tom* of ths B firms:

~r(a othsr applicants apply)=

4.3)

c·N-l )(m*/B)a(l
a

N 1

- m*/B) - -a~

•

This is a binomial random variabls with param,t,rs N-l and m /B.

It is assum,d

•

that m is lsss than Band that no worksr applies to the sams firm twics.

•

can bs shown that ths s,cond assumption is optimal b,havior because m
which holds by ths assumption about costs.

4.4)

max(O, l - n/(a+l))(

N-1

It

<B

Therefor,:

•
a
•
N-1-a
)(m /B) (1 - (m /B))
.

a

Section S:

Equilibrium

It can b, shown that thsr, ,xists a Nash equilibrium to ths supply
sid,.

• such that when th,
An equilibrium is characterized by a pair, m• and y,

• sach worker applies tom
probability of r,j,ction is y,
worker applies tom

• firms,

•

firms, and when each

•

the probability of r,j,ction is y. Sine,

10

2
2
a v/am

< 0 for all values of m, there exists a unique solution.to equation
> 0 and v•.

(3.2) for any given value of y

Since

v•

is the maximum value of

•

V(m} for any level of y, it is straightforward to show that V

Thus, there exists a unique solution to equation

differentiable function of y.
(3.2) for any value of y.

is a continuous,

Denote this solution as m = M(y).

Rewriting

equation (3.2), M(y) satisfies:

lnC'(M(y)) - M(y)lny = g(y)

5.1)

if M(y) 2 0 where g(y)

= ln(-lny)

•

+ ln[Pw/(1-P) - PV (y)].

Otherwise, M(y)

=

g(y) is a continuous function that is differentiable at all values of yon

O.

the interval (0,1] except for one point.

8

The derivative, M'(y),exists for all

Thus, in equation (3.2), m can be

values of M(y) where M(y) is positive.

written as a continuous function of yon the half-open interval (0,1] that is
differentiable at all points except for one.
lim M(y) = 0 as y

->

0.

It can be shown that

If M(0) is defined to be zero, then Mis defined and

continuous on the closed interval [0,1].

Also, from equation (4.4),

r

can be

written as:

r • = rem• ) .

5.2)

8

The one point is r' where

•

To the left of this point dV /dy

•

dV /dy = 0.
allowed.

< 0,

M(y')

= 0 and M(y) > 0 for any r < y'.

and to the right of this point

This occurs because negative applications are not

So if the solution to equation 5.1 is negative, then M(y) must

be defined as equal to zero.

The point where the nonnegativity constraint

becomes binding is not differentiable , but it is still continuous.

11

Let:

5.3)

=

F(y)

f(M(y))

F{y) is the probability of not being offered a job if everyone thought that the
probability of not being offered a job was y.

If each worker thought that the

probability of not being offered a job was r, each would each apply tom

•=

M(y) firms, and then the actual probability of not being offered a job would be

•

r(m ).

F(y) is continuous, and both its range and domain are the unit interval •

Thus, by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there exists a pointy

•

S.4)

F(y) =

• where:

•
r.

•

•

This point, r, corresponds to a supply side equilibrium where m = M(y) is the
symmetric Nash equilibri_um strategy for each worbr.

Thus, there is at last

·one Nash equilibrium point.
The argument above only demonstratu the exishnce of an equilibrium.
In fact the equilibrium may be at y = O.
least one nontrivial equilibrium (0

It can be shown that there is also at

< y < 1).

This is shown for the case where

C''(m) = 0 although the result holds for the more general case, C''{m)
First, note that if y
any firm.
= O.

l

O.

= 1, then workers have no incentive to apply to

But if no one applies at all, then equation {2.10) implies that F{l)

If it can be shown that lim F(y)

>0

-> 0, then the result will have been shown.
there must be a O

<r <1

where F(y) = y.

as y

->

0 or that lim F'{y)

>1

as y

Since F(y) is below rat unity,

12
It can be shown that lim F'(y) as
0, this is enough for the result.

r ->

Since lim F(y) 2. 0 as

0.

r ->

9

FIGURE S.1 EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
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It is very difficult to determine how many equilibria there are

since it is difficult to determine F'(r) at points other than

r

= 0.

If there is only one equlibrium. then it will be stable.
more than one, then generically every other one will be stable.
that expectations about rare adaptive, i.e.:

S.Sa)

for some positive constant a.
intersects r from above.

Then equilibria are stable if F(y)

•

This occurs when (ar/am )(aM/ay) ( 1.

If there are
Assume

13
Section 6:

W,lfare R,sults

It has already been noted that y increases as m* increases.

But for

*
any particular worker, y is a function of all other workers' m's,
and any
particular worker's m* affects all other workers' r's.

Because the cost that a

worker incurs in applying for a job includ,s only his search cost and no charge
for the worker's effect on other workers' chances of getting a job when he
· submits extra applications, one might expect worker search at equilibrium to be
inefficiently large.

Actually. when there is unemployment insurance, a charge

is implicitly levied for obtaining a job through the loss of unemployment
insurance benefits.
This can be looked at more formally.
each worker is described in equation (3.2).
a term for the effect of m* on y.

On

The first order condition for
But this equation does not include

the other hand, if the workers were to

form a coalition for one period, they would consider the effect -0f m* on y.
Thus. the coalition's first order condition for the maximization problem
described in equation (3.1) would be:

6.1)

-C'{m) - [y mlny + my ~1 ((ay/ym)/(1 - (ay/am)(am/ay)))] *

which can be written as:

6.2)

where av 1 (m)/am is an individual's first order condition.

Since the second

14
term of equation (6.2) is positive and an individual would behave so that the
first term was equal to zero, the supply side equilibrium cannot be Pareto
optimal for workers, taking UI payments as given.
require av (m)/am
1

A Pareto optimum would

> 0 which implies that the coalition's optimal choice of mis

•

less than equilibrium m.

Thus, there may be room for a social planner to

•

Such interventions could be UI payments or

intervene in order to decrease m.
a tax on applications.

A social planner could maximize a representative worker's value of
search by impl~menting a UI benefits program supported by a tax on the wages of
workers once they were employed.

The program could be built so that expected

discounted UI benefit payments to each worker would be paid for by expect,d
discounted wage tax revenues from that worker.

Even though each worker's net

balance would not equal zero, on average the program would be in discounted
budget balance and the deviation from budget balance would be insignificant
relative to the size of the program.

,The social planner would have to be aware

of how each worker would react to both a UI benefit and a tax on wages.

He

would have to maximize a representative worker's value of search subject to the
reaction function of workers to his program.
be to solve:

A social planner's problem would

15
where ~w is a tax on wages,
per period.

~

C

is a tax on application s, and u is a UI payment

The first constraint states that each individual maximizes his

value of search using Nash expectation s, and the second constraint states that
expected discounted UI payments equal expected discounted tax revenues.

The

tax, ~. can be thought of as a steady state tax that started in the infinite
w
past.

If, instead. it is thought of as a tax that starts at some point in

time. then those who are not searching initially should not be taxed; the

government should borrow funds to pay for UI benefits and use later tax
receipts to pay back the funds.

In either of these ways the problem of an

initial welfare transfer is avoided.
It is probably infeasible to have a tax on application s.

There are too

many ways that people actually apply for jobs, and many of them are difficult
to monitor.

Thus,

~

C

is set equal to zero.

The optimal positive wage tax,~, and UI payment. u, would be at a
w
point where the derivative of the Lagrangian for equation (6.3) with respect to
~

w

and·u was equal to zero and the constraints were_ satisfied.

this problem is too difficult to find analyticall y.

The solution to

But it can be shown that

both~ and u should be positive.
w
In equation (6.3), substitute the government budget constraint into the
Lagrangian for u with~

6.4)

C

= 0:

. •
L = -C(m) + ~w/(1-~) - y m[~w/(1-p) - ~V
].

Note that since there is a balanced budget, equation (6.4) contains no tax
terms.

Government interventio n only affects welfare through its incentive

effect on m.

Now differentia te equation {6.4) with respect to~

w

at~

w

= 0:

16
6.5)

dL(O)/d-r

w

•
- m• -r m•-1 [Pw/(1-p> - PV 1 •

•

•

((a-r/am )/(1 - (aa/am • )(am /aa))(Dm• /D-r )

•

where Dm /D-r

w

= am•ta-r w
•

which is the total change in m at -r
individuals' choice of mat -r

w

= O.

w

w

•

<0

+ (am /au)(au/a-r)
w

= 0 when -r

•

w

is changed, and m equals

The first term of equation (6.5) is an

individual's first order condition, and the second term is the effect of
increases in m• on ym•

6.6)

dL(O)/d-r

w

Since the first term equals zero:

= -m•rm•-l[Pw/(1-P) - pv•] •

•

•

•

•

((ay/am )/(1 - (ay/am )(am /ay)))(Dm /D-r)

which is positive for stabh equilibria (see footnote 9).
'tw

w

The increase in L at

= 0 is the incremental reduction in not being offered a job by y falling a

•

little because m falls by Om /D-rw·
increasing

Thus welfare can be improved at -rw = 0 by

't'.

w

The government could alternately finance UI payments by a tax,

't',

w

on

employed workers high enough so that u = x-r ww where xis the expected ratio of
employed to unemployed workers.

With this kind of budget balance, it is

difficult to determine whether a positive tax is optimal since it depends upon
steady state-rand x which in turn depend on the tax.

A sufficient

17
condition for the optimal tax to be positive is x

l

~(l-ym)/(l-~). 10

It is

easy to show that when xis relatively low and ym is relatively high (meaning
there is a high unemployment rate). the optimal tax is not necessarily
positive.
There is an externality in a market with this form of UI that is not
present in the first form.

In this form. when a worker accepts a job, he stops

collecting UI benefits and starts paying taxes.

The amount of taxes collected

directly affects how much can be paid as UI benefits and vice versa because of
the need for a balanced budget; the faster an average worker gets a job, the
lower are taxes and the higher are UI benefits.

Since any particular worker

ignores his effect on the taxes other employed workers must pay and UI benefits
other unemployed workers can receive, he is not searching fast enough.

This·

externality is not present in the first form of a UI program because each
worker's expected net receipts from the government are individually set equal
to zero.
The first UI program analyzed in this paper only has social value
because of its disincentive effect on search.

Workers receive payments of u

until they are employed, and then they pay premiums of~ w forever.
w

The UI

lOThis condition comes from each worker maximizing:

6.6a)

V(m) = u -

C(m) + ~w(l-~ )/(1-P)
w
- ym[~w(l-~ )/(1-~) - PV(m)]

w

and then the planner maximizing a representative worker's utility subject to a)
each worker maximizing his own utility using Nash expectations and b) the

budget constraint holding.

Also. note that

in equation (2.26) with~

C

= 0,
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Workers are only ex ante better off with~ w

program has a zsro expected value.

> o.

Some workers, those who find jobs quickly, may be worse off than they

would have beea if~

w

had been zero.

11

To visualize how this program fits into

the real world, we should think of all labor force participants as entering the
market without jobs and also possibly later facing the risk of a spell of
unemployment.

Section 7:

Steady State Dynamics

There is one other extemality which may exist but cannot easily be
discussed within the framework of this model.

When a worker searches a little

harder he improves his chances of getting a job.
longer searches.

Once he gets a job, he no

Therefore, his searching a little harder has the effect of

reducing both the expected number of unemployed workers and the expected number
of vacancies in the next period.

To the extent this affects the next period's

unemployed workers' chances of finding jobs, there is an interperiod
externality. ·

11 rf the planner preferred ex post equality over inequality, then the
UI program would have some extra value. In the real world, social planners
prefer equity.

Since those who find jobs quickly benefit the least from the UI

program, the program promotes ex post equality.

But the UI program has no

effect on ex ante equality since it has an ex ante expected value of zero.
Thus, for this effect to be of any significance, the planner's ex ante social
welfare function must be an expected value of a monotone function of a strictly
concave combination of the workers' ex post utilities.
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In order to discuss the importance of this externality with any more
precision, both N, the total number of unemployed workers per period, and nB,
the total number of vacancies per period, must become endogenous variables.
Let EN be the total, exogenous number of new entrants to the labor market each
period and E

8

be the total, exogenous number of new vacancies advertised.

The

economy can be described by four equations:

7.3)

where A is the probability that a vacancy does not get filled.

For example, if

n = 1 and Nt and Bt are large. equations {7.3) and {7.4) are:

7.S)

7.6)

The steady state levels of N and nB are: 12

12 0nly a steady state solution is meaningful here because m was
derived
under a steady state assumption.
then m would not be constant.

If the economy was not in a steady state,
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Note that equation (7.6) and (7.7) imply that steady states can only exist if
EN= E •
8

This implies that the ratio. NIB. is not determined by the steady

state equations, (7.7). alone.

Instead, it can be shown that it is determined

m
by the initial difference between N and B. by EN= E • and by y.
8

A.

Let N - nB =

It can be shown that:

For simplicity. the case where n = 1 and where N and B approach
infinity at the same rate is considered.

In this case. the number of

applications a firm receives approaches a Poisson distribution.

Soy can be

written as:

7.9)

y = 1 - e-µ - (1 - e-µ(1+µ))µ
= 1 -

whereµ= mN/B.

(1 - ,-µ)/µ

The probability of finding a job is 1-rm.

Substitution of the

definition of y from equation (7.9) and differentiation results in:

7.10)

Increases in m increase workers chances of getting jobs even though y rises.
The steady state effects of a small increase in m on y can be
determined.

First of all, when m increases holding the number of workers and
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vacancies fixed, y increases because of the mechanics discussed earlier
(differentiate equation (7.9) with respect tom).

But ym decreases which

decreases the steady state level of N and B which has another effect on y:

7.11)

ag/am is positive. ay/a(N/B) is positive. and aym/am is negative.

Only the

·m
sign of a(N/B)/ay is not determined.

If N

= B,

then the probability of a worker getting a job equals the

probability of a firm filling a vacancy.
reduction in B of the same size.
N/B; a(N/B)/aym

= O.

Any reduction in N will result in a

Changes in r m have no effect on the ratio,

Therefore, when N

= B,

when the only unemployment is

search unemployment, there is no interperiod effect.
exogenous levels of N and B still hold.

All of the results with

An economy with only search

unemployment is not Pareto efficient.

1 3This equation is derived as follows:
N/B using equation (7.9).

Write y as a function of m and

Write NIB as a fu.n.ction of rm using equation (7.8).

It can be shown that:

which has the same sign as 1 - N/B.

using equation (7.9).

Also. write ym as a function of m and N/B

The result can be derived by differentiating each

equation and then using Cramer's rule to solve the set of linear equations.
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If N

< B,

then an increase in both N and B will increase NIB. making
Whether the interperiod effect is negative or positive

a{NIB)laym positive.

depends upon whether {aymla(NIB)){a{NIB)laym) is greater than or less than one.
If it is less than one, the interperiod effect is negative.
may even be possible for dyldm to -be negative.
effect is positive.

If N

> B,

In this case. it

Otherwise the interperiod

then increases in N and B decrease NIB.

increasing the size ·of the externality.

The cases where N l Bare the most

interesting cases to consider for both theoretical and empirical reasons.

In

these cases there is room for a UI program: the greater is NIB, the more
beneficial is the program.

Section 8:

Conclusions

A supply side equilibrium search model with no distribution of wage
offers is presented in this paper.
high offers.

Workers search for job openings rather than

Stern (1985), has empirically shown that this type of search is

more prevalent than search for high offers.

The existence of competition among

workers for a limited number of job openings leads to an inefficiently high
amount of search.

However, an unemployment insurance program set up in the

proper way can induce each worker to choose the socially optimal search
inhnsity.
Many authors have discussed the effects of unemployment insurance on
the behavior of workers looking for a job.

Theoretical papers include

Mortensen (1970) and Lippmann and McCall (1979).

Empirical papers include

Barron and Gilley (1979), Clark and Summers (1982), Classen (1977). Fields
(1977), Hills (1982) and Holen (1977).

The overwhelming consensus is that

unemployment insurance decreases search intensity and increases the average
spell of unemployment.

The same result occurs in this paper.

However,
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contrary to most other papers. this is found to have some positive value.
The proposed unemployment insurance program was quite different than
the one that presently exisits in most western nations.

In fact. the system

that presently exisits was shown to possibly induce workers to decrease their
search intensity too much.

In the real world. unemployment insurance has other

roles besides inducing workers to search optimally.

Concerns for equity play a

major roh in the design of unemployment insurance.

Thus. the optimal program

must trade off equity against efficiency according to the preferences of
society.
There is no mention of the demand side of the labor market.
analysis of the demand side is beyond the scope of this paper.
(198S). Chapter IV for such a discussion.

An

See Stern

However. it should be noted that

while the proposed unemployment insurance program improv,s the ex ante welfare

of each worker. it potentially reduces the profits of the firms in the market
or consumers buying the product being produced by the firms.

This problem is

common to the rivalry literature as well; no one has included the welfare of
the product to be produced once Rand D has been completed.
equilibrium model of search with competition is still needed.

A general
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